Introduction

The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) Convention, 1965, created to resolve investment disputes, has 165 Contracting States who are parties to the treaty.[1] As per Article 66(1) of the ICSID Convention, any amendment to the Convention would require the ‘ratification, acceptance or approval’ of all the Contracting States for a proposed amendment to come into force. However, the Administrative Council, which is the governing body of the ICSID, comprises the Member States and under Article 6 of the Convention is empowered to adopt rules and regulations in consonance with the Convention. In exercising the said powers, the Administrative Council has enacted nine sets of rules, including the ICSID Institution Rules, Arbitration Rules, and Additional Facility Rules.

It is imperative to note that, unlike the ICSID Convention, amendments to Rules and Regulations do not require the ratification, acceptance or approval of all Contracting States but only require a two-thirds majority vote of the Administrative Council as per Article 6(1) of the Convention. The Rules and Regulations have undergone three major rounds of amendments prior to 2022. In 2022, the Administrative Council approved a ‘comprehensive set of amendments to all of its Rules and Regulations, which came into effect on 1^st July 2022.[2]  This article’s scope shall be confined to analysing the ICSID Institution Rules, 2022 (‘ICSIDIR’) and the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 2022 (‘ICSIDAR’).

The ICSID Administrative Council has created and amended various rules and regulations to make the arbitration process more transparent, efficient, clear and flexible.[3] Akin to the previous amendments, the key themes of the 2022 amendments to the Rules and Regulations have remained to be transparency and efficiency, and the sub-themes have been clarity and flexibility. The subsequent chapters will delve into a few important provisions that denote the key themes of the changes, the impact of those changes, and the limitations, if any and will be compared to the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’), London Court of International Arbitration (‘LCIA’) and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) Arbitration Rules.

Greater Transparency

Transparency has particularly found importance and attention in international investment arbitration laws,[4] because investment disputes between a host state and an investor are often sensitive, come under public scrutiny, has huge financial implications and are often politicised.[5] Furthermore, the people of the host state are essential stakeholders as foreign investments are made to benefit them, and hence they are directly or indirectly affected by it.[6] Until recently, ISDS disputes were kept confidential, leading to criticism of the system and has nudged States’ to review or terminate their investment treaties.[7]

   Transparency is referred to as the antithesis of the concept of confidentiality, which is a fundamental feature of commercial arbitrations.[8] Thus, transparency is understood as a mechanism that aims to protect and further public interest and, as a result, has facilitated access to the documents related to arbitration proceedings.[9] This is a predominant theme of the 2022 amendments to the ICSIDAR.

1. Publication of awards and other documents and protection of confidential information

For publication of Awards and Decisions on Annulment, consent is ‘deemed to have been given’ if the parties to the proceeding choose not to object within 60 days ‘after the dispatch of the document’.[10] Similarly, for orders and decisions, Rule 63 stipulates that these documents can be published without the parties consent.[11] However, the parties have the flexibility to either entirely object to the publication or jointly propose redactions. Unlike awards and orders, party submissions, expert reports and exhibits would require parties’ consent, and redactions would require joint notifications by all parties.[12]

All of the above-referred rules list an exception to publication, i.e. a tribunal cannot disclose confidential and protected information, which has been enumerated under Rule 66 of the ICSIDAR.[13] Rule 66 was meant to guide parties and the tribunal on when information would be considered confidential and protected.[14] These amendments highlight the transparency brought to the process of arbitration, which will, in turn, bring more legitimacy to the process of investment arbitrations by developing a more coherent and consistent body of jurisprudence.[15] However, the concept of deemed consent conflicts with Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention, which states that awards cannot be published without the parties consent.[16] The Administrative Council, which is a creature of the Convention and only empowered to further the provisions of the Convention, has gone beyond the terms of the Convention by including the deeming provision in Rule 62.

These amendments, when juxtaposed with the ICC Arbitration Rules, 2021 (‘ICC Rules’), would show that the ICC Rules don’t contain an express provision regarding the same but a Note released by the ICC under the ICC Rules announced that all arbitral awards will be published, two years after their notification.[17], subject to parties’ objections or requests.[18] The LCIA Arbitration Rules, 2020 (‘LCIA Rules’), under Article 30.3, specifically states that the ‘award or any part of an award’ is not published by the LCIA without the ‘prior written consent’ of not only ‘all parties’ but the arbitral tribunal’s (‘AT’) as well.[19] The ICSIDAR are specifically drafted for the ISDS arbitrations, and hence, the ICC and the LCIA rules have not elaborated on the rules on transparency as much as the ICSIDAR, as these institutions guarantee more confidentiality to the process of commercial arbitrations.

Similar to the ICSIDAR, the UNCITRAL has adopted a separate set of Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (‘UNCITRAL Transparency Rules’),[20] which specifically states that these rules shall apply to ‘investor-state arbitration initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (‘UNCITRAL Rules’).[21] The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules specifically list the documents that will be made available to the public subject to Article 7, which lists out the ‘Exception to transparency’, which includes confidential and protected information,[22] information against essential security interests,[23] and if the release of information would ‘jeopardise the integrity of the arbitral proceedings’.[24] Therefore, it is safe to conclude that UNCITRAL Transparency Rules are more robust and provide more clarity to the transparency process in ISDS arbitration, even though the parties lack flexibility compared to the ICSIDAR.

1. Notice of Third-Party Funding (‘TPF’)

TPF is financing by an entity not a party to a particular dispute but ‘funds another party’s legal fees or pays an order, award, or judgment rendered against that party, or both’.[25] The details and terms of these TPF agreements are often not disclosed. However, as part of its transparency drive, the ICSIDAR included the procedure for mandatory disclosure to help arbitrators identify any possible conflicts of interest.[26] It mandates the disclosure of the ‘name and address of any non-party (including disclosure of names of persons and entities that control a juridical person) who has ‘directly or indirectly’ funded a party to the dispute ‘for the pursuit or defence of the proceeding through a donation or grant, or in return for remuneration dependent on the outcome of the proceeding’.[27] The provision does not stipulate the disclosure of the TPF agreement itself, as it may be inconsistent with the ICSID Convention.[28]

   However, the ICSIDAR vests the tribunal with the power to seek ‘further information regarding the TPF agreement and the funder,[29] ‘if it deems it necessary at any stage of the proceeding’.[30] This provision is wide and may result in ATs misusing the same. Interestingly, prior to the ICSIDAR coming into force, several tribunals constituted under the ICSID Convention rejected the request to disclose the TPF agreement’s contents.[31] Thus, the new regime will only promote the usage of the narrower rules in a much more restricted manner.

   Akin to ICSIDAR, Article 11(7) of the ICC Rules cites the assistance to arbitrators for their disclosures as the reason for a party to ‘inform the secretariat, the AT and the other parties’ of the ‘existence and identity’ of any arrangement entered into with a funder, who has an ‘economic interest in the outcome of the arbitration’.[32] However, the ICC Rules lack clarity on what constitutes ‘identity’ unlike the ICSIDAR, which specifically seeks to disclose certain details such as the name and address. The ICC Rules do not contain timelines for these details to be disclosed, like the ICSIDAR. This may indicate clarity under the ICSIDAR but more flexibility under the ICC Rules.

            The LCIA does not contain any express procedure pertaining to TPF. However, under Article 22(iv) of the LCIA Rules, an AT can order a party ‘make documents available for inspection.’[33] and under 22(v) has the power to order a party to produce documents ‘which the AT decides to be relevant’.[34] However, there seems to be no evidence of using these provisions to ascertain details pertaining to the TPF agreement. The UNCITRAL Rules also do not contain any express provisions pertaining to TPF. The UNCITRAL Working Group-III has prepared draft provisions pertaining to TPF, who are still working on arriving at a concrete definition for TPF.[35]

1. Contents of the Request

The ICSID Institution Rules (‘ICSIDIR’), 2022 amended the ‘Contents of the Request’ under Rule 2 by enumerating different requirements that must be made part of the request.[36] The amended rules mandate disclosure of details about the investment, ownership and control, which was not part of the ICSIDIR, 2006.[37] It has been drafted reflecting the existing practice, i.e. the requesting party must divulge the contents to determine jurisdiction issues.[38] This was primarily owing to ICSID Member states’ concerns regarding the complex corporate structures of the requesting investor parties.[39]

Moreover, the requesting party must provide details pertaining to the estimate of the amount of any damages sought.[40] Therefore, this will lead to more transparency from the requesting party, which will, in turn, lead to efficiency in the process of deciding issues of jurisdiction as the ICSIDIR has been drafted with immense clarity and precision.

   Similar to the ICISIDIR, the ICC Rules[41], the LCIA Rules[42] and the UNCITRAL Rules[43] lists out the information required to be furnished and the disclosure of the monetary value of the dispute or the amounts in dispute. Therefore, it is clear that the ICSIDIR is tailor-made to suit the necessities of ISDS treaty-based arbitrations as it mandates disclosure of details pertaining to the control, ownership and investment of the requesting party, which are absent in the other commercial arbitration institution rules. However, the changes made to the ICSID Institution Rules bring more transparency, efficiency and clarity to the process, as discussed hereinabove.  

Increased Efficiency

Efficiency was not a key feature of international arbitration two decades ago, as there were serious issues pertaining to the cost and the length of the proceedings.[44] Paradoxically, arbitration has always been viewed as the means of dispute settlement that was both cost and time efficient, unlike litigations brought before national courts.[45] Nevertheless, in the recent past, efforts have been made to improve the efficiency of the process of arbitration, especially through institutional rules and other conventions.[46]

1. Expedited Arbitration

The ICSIDAR took the cue from this movement towards increased efficiency and introduced a separate set of rules to facilitate Expedited Arbitration (‘ExA’) akin to various commercial arbitration institutions.[47] ExA is a broad concept that aims at disposing of a case on a summary basis and accelerating dispute resolution.[48] The drafters of the ICSIDAR acknowledge these features/aims of ExA while focussing on lower costs involved in the process.[49]

   The ICSIDAR is entirely reliant upon the parties consenting jointly to ExA.[50] Appositely, the parties can jointly opt out of ExA at any time,[51] which highlights the importance to consent under the ICSIDAR to initiate ExA. The rules exclude the application of certain overlapping rules contained under the ICSIDAR and other provisions like the appointment of experts, visits, inquiries, bifurcation and consolidation, which is impossible in ExA.[52] Strict timelines have been culled out from the first session till the issuance of the award.[53] ICSIDAR caps the maximum grace period that can be granted at 30 days.[54]

   Given the strict timelines laid down, ExA under the ICSIDAR will significantly increase efficiency. However, as some critics view it, an ExA can be successful only if the parties and their counsels have a cooperative attitude, which cannot be replicated in most cases.[55] Parties and counsels tend to be more litigious by taking recourse to all possible avenues, such as document production, cross-examination and procedural challenges, affecting the time and cost efficiency.[56] In fact, given that ExA under ICSIDAR is entirely based on the joint consent of the parties, the same can be misused to sabotage the proceedings, leading to higher inefficiencies.

   As mentioned above, ICSIDAR has taken a cue from other commercial arbitration institutions, such as ICC, in developing the ExA Rules. Article 30, read with Appendix VI of the ICC Rules, go on to show that parties can opt for ExA subject to the ‘amount in dispute’ not exceeding the limit set out under ICC Rules[57]. While most procedures are similar to that of the ICSIDAR, the one difference between the ICSIDAR and the ICC Rules is that the maximum cap of amounts in dispute has not been set under the ICSIDAR.

The UNCITRAL Expedited Rules are also reliant upon the consent of the parties to either opt-in or opt-out,[58] is much more detailed as it not only lays down procedural timelines but also lays down the procedure for the notice of arbitration,[59] to hearings,[60] counterclaims[61] and evidence.[62] Therefore, while ICC and the ICSIDAR merge the ExA rules with the main body of rules, UNCITRAL has prepared an exclusive document that will govern ExA in isolation from the UNCITRAL Rules.

The LCIA are yet to develop a separate set of ExA Rules, but it provides an Expedited Formation of AT in case a party can showcase urgency.[63] Moreover, the LCIA Rules empower a tribunal to ‘pass a procedural order that it considers appropriate with regard to fair, efficient and expeditious conduct of the arbitration’, which includes ‘exercising powers’ to ‘limit the length or dispense with, any written statement, hearing’ and ‘setting timelines for any stage of the arbitrations.[64] Therefore, these wide powers vested under the LCIA Rules allow a tribunal to adopt a procedure that may be similar to ExA.

1. Consolidation or Coordination of Arbitration

The ICSIDAR incorporated a rule pertaining to the Consolidation or Coordination of arbitrations.[65] According to Rule 46 of the ICSIDAR, parties can agree to either consolidate or coordinate ‘two or more’ pending arbitration that they are parties to.[66] While consolidation of proceedings ‘results in one award.’[67] , coordination facilitates only the alignment of ‘procedural aspects’ of the arbitrations.[68] The parties also have the flexibility of proposing the ‘terms for the conduct of the consolidated or coordinated arbitrations’.[69] Pertinently, arbitrations constituted under the ICSIDAR, 2006 have been aligned or have been consolidated in a de facto manner.[70] While the impact of this addition may be minimal, the clarity brought forth by ICSIDAR, 2022 would promote efficiency as proceedings can be formally consolidated, making it both cost and time efficient.

   Similarly, both the ICC Rules[71] and the LCIA Rules[72] contain a procedure for consolidation of arbitrations and, unlike the ICSDAR, considers additional factors, such as if there is the ‘same arbitration agreement or agreements’, ‘same disputing parties’ and if the dispute arises out of the ‘same transaction or series of related transactions’.[73] Both the LCIA and the ICC are commercial arbitration rules; they have wider powers for consolidation compared to ICSIDAR. However, the UNCITRAL Rules do not contain provisions regarding the consolidation of arbitrations.

1. Bifurcation

Even though bifurcation of the jurisdictional phase was possible under Article 41(2) of the ICSID Convention[74] read with Rule 41(3) of the ICSIDAR 2006,[75] the 2022 amendments brought more clarity to the entire process. ICSIDAR 2022 allows a party to request a question to be ‘addressed in a separate phase of the proceeding’.[76] Interestingly, preliminary objections with a request for bifurcation have been dealt with under a separate provision with a different procedure.[77] However, the relevant circumstances that should be taken into account by a tribunal under both these rules are the same, i.e. the tribunal should consider whether it would materially reduce ‘the time and cost of the proceeding’ if a substantial portion of the dispute would stand disposed of, if bifurcated and to see if the ‘questions to be dealt with are so intertwined as to make bifurcation impractical’.[78]

   Assuming that party succeeds in their bifurcation request, it would save costs and time for all the stakeholders involved, as already proven by statistics.[79] Therefore, the clarity brought to the rules would, in turn, lead to increased efficiency. However, the ICC Rules do not contain express provisions like the ICSIDAR, but Appendix IV of the ICC Rules deals with case management techniques, which provides that bifurcation of proceedings may result in efficiency and has been cited as an example of case management techniques that are of aid to the AT.[80]

Similarly, the LCIA Rules has no provision pertaining to bifurcation, but an arbitration under LCIA can be bifurcated by relying upon Article 14.5 of the LCIA Rules, under which a tribunal can make orders with regard to ‘fair, efficient and expeditious conduct of the arbitration.’[81] and more specifically, can determine the stage at which an issue or issues can be determined.[82] Therefore, the wide provisions under LCIA Rules empower a tribunal to bifurcate proceedings in the name of efficiency. Similarly, the UNCITRAL Rules do not contain a specific procedure for bifurcation like the ICC and LCIA but contain broad provisions to exercise discretion to provide an ‘efficient process.’[83] to resolve the dispute, they can make ‘separate awards on different issues at different times’.[84]

1. Security for costs

The ICSIDAR introduced a rule empowering a tribunal to order a party to post security for costs while sundering the concept from provisional measures, i.e. by providing a stand-alone authority to order security for costs.[85] Rule 53 lists a procedure to be followed and sets out ‘relevant circumstances’ that must be considered, such as ‘ability to comply, willingness to comply, party’s ability and the conduct of the parties’.[86] Moreover, ‘if a party fails to comply with an order to provide security’, the tribunal shall have the power to suspend the proceedings and even discontinue the proceedings, should the circumstances arise.[87]

   Rule 53 of the ICSIDAR is clear and directly impacts cost efficiency. Nearly 10% of an award represents costs and has an average value of US$ 1.2 million in each dispute.[88] Therefore, introducing this provision will provide more clarity that will lead to more cost efficiency as it will help shorten the proceedings and reduce the case-management strain of ICSID.[89] The ICSIDAR has taken inspiration from other commercial arbitration institutions, such as the ICC,[90] LCIA,[91] and UNCITRAL[92] who had already formulated a specific procedure for ordering security/advance/deposit for costs.

   A point of difference among these rules is that the ICSIDAR[93] and the UNCITRAL[94] Rules allow ordering any of the parties to provide security/deposit of costs, whereas the ICC[95] and LCIA Rules specifically use the terms claimant or ‘any claiming or counterclaiming or cross-claiming party’.[96] Another point of difference that exists between these rules is pertaining to the effect of non-compliance wherein the ICSIDAR and UNCITRAL Rules contemplate either suspension or even termination of the proceedings itself, whereas the ICC Rules deem the claims as withdrawn and the LCIA Rules empower tribunals to either stay or dismiss the claims.[97] Therefore, it is clear that the ICSIDAR has depended upon the UNCITRAL Rules, and both possess wider powers when juxtaposed with LCIA and ICC.

Conclusion

The above-discussed changes showcase the broad themes of the ICSIDAR to be transparency and efficiency, which is further solidified by clarity and flexibility. Transparency and confidentiality are two sides to the same coin and are distinct concepts with distinct takers for them in international arbitrations. Transparency is a creature of ISDS treaty-based disputes between a host state and investor, whereas confidentiality is the key to most commercial arbitrations between two private parties. Transparency has gained importance only because governments are to be more accountable to the public. In contrast, such accountability does not exist for a private party merely resolving a contractual dispute. Institutions such as the ICC and LCIA lure private parties to adopt their rules by guaranteeing confidentiality and leaving that determination to them. Therefore, it is clear that different institutions take different approaches for same concepts to cater or appeal to specific users.

            With regard to efficiency, the ICSIDAR has also put in place mandatory timelines for procedural compliance. The above changes, as well as other changes concerning efficiency, have been inspired and borrowed in some cases from commercial arbitration institution rules such as the ICC and LCIA Rules. Moreover, unlike the ICSID, ICC and LCIA do not require the ratification of States or even require the Administrative Council to vote upon amendments, which in turn leads to institutions such as ICC and LCIA being more flexible and quick with the changes they bring about, which ultimately promotes efficiency in arbitrations they administer.

[1] ICSID website, ‘About ICSID’ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-states/database-of-member-states> accessed 12 April 2023.

[2] ICSID Website, ‘News Releases’, < https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/communiques/icsid-administrative-council-approves-amendment-icsid-rules > accessed 13 April 2023.

[3] Antonio R.Parra, ‘The 2022 Amendments of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Change and Continuity’ (2022) 23 Brill Journal of World Investment & Trade < https://brill-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/view/journals/jwit/23/5-6/article-p717_2.xml> accessed 13 April 2023.

[4] Julie Maupin, ‘Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Murky’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law (OUP 2013).

[5] Wong M and Hadgett R, Transparency in International Investment Arbitration: A Guide to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (Dimitrij Euler, Markus Gehring and Maxi Scherer eds Cambridge University Press 2015).

[6] Amado, Jose, ‘’From Investors Arbitration to Investment Arbitration: A Mechanism for Allowing the Participation of Host State Populations in the Settlement of Investment Conflicts’ (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 8/2014 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2385776 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2385776> accessed 18 April 2023.

[7] See n 3.

[8] ibid.

[9] ibid.

[10] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 62(3).

[11] ibid, Rule 63.

[12] ibid, Rule 64(1).

[13] ibid, Rule 66.

[14] ICSID, ‘Proposal for Amendment of the ICSID Rules- Working Paper 3’ (August 2019) < https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/WP_3_VOLUME_1_ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 16 April 2023, para 165.

[15] N Jansen Calamita, ‘Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe’s Evolving Investment Treaty Policy: Adopting the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules Approach’ (2014) 15 JWICL < https://brill-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/view/journals/jwit/15/3-4/article-p645_14.xml> accessed 16 April 2023, 650–53.

[16] ICSID Convention 1965, Article 48(5).

[17]ICC Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration (2019).

[18] ibid.

[19] LCIA Arbitration Rules (2020), Article 30.3.

[20] UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2021).

[21] ibid, Article 1(1).            

[22] ibid, Article 3(1).

[23] ibid, Article 7(5).

[24] ibid, Article 7(6).

[25] Maya Steinitz, ‘Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding’ (2011) 95 Minn. L. Rev <https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/HOL/Page?lname=&public=false&collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/mnlr95&men_hide=false&men_tab=toc&kind=&page=1268 > accessed 17 April 2023.

[26] ICSID, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules – Working Paper # 6’ (‘WP 6’) (November 2019) https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/documents/ICSID_WP_Six.pdf> accessed 17 April 2023, 19.

[27] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 14(1).

[28] ICSID, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules – Working Paper # 4’ (February 2020) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/WP_4_Vol_1_En.pdf> accessed 5 October 2021, para 54.

[29] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 14(4).

[30] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 36(3).

[31]Astrida Benita Carrizosa v Republic of Colombia, ICSID Case No ARB/18/5, (Procedural Order No. 1 (19 February 2019); Latam Hydro LLC and CH Mamacocha SRL v Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/19/28, Procedural Order No. 2 (13 May 2020).

[32] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 11(7).

[33] LCIA Arbitration Rules (2020), Article 22(iv).

[34] ibid, Article 22(v).

[35] UNCITRAL WG-III (ISDS Reform), Draft provisions on procedural reform, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.219 < https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/wp_219_-_draft_provisions_on_procedural_reform_.pdf> accessed 18 April 2023, 12.

[36] ICSID Institution Rules (2022), Rule 2.

[37] ibid.

[38] ICSID, ‘Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules – Working Paper # 5’ (June 15 2021) < https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/documents/WP%205-Volume1-ENG-FINAL.pdf> accessed 18 April 2023, 20.

[39] ICSID, ‘Compendium of Comments for Working Paper No. 4’ (March 23, 2021) available at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/amendments/Compendium%20of%20State%20Comm ents%20on%20Proposed%20Amendments%20to% 20the%20ICSID%20Rules%20- WP%20%23%204%20- %20As%20of%202021.03.23.pdf > accessed 19 April 2023.

[40] ICSID Institution Rules (2022), Rule 2.

[41] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 4(3).

[42] LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 1.1(iii).

[43] UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 3(3)(e). 

[44] Loukas Mistelis, ‘International Arbitration-Corporate Attitudes and Practices- 12 Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report’ (2004) Am. Rev. of Int’l Arb.  <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/IAstudy_2006.pdf> accessed 19 April 2023, 9.

[45] American Arbitration Association, ‘Dispute Wise Business Management: An American Arbitration Association Sponsored Study’ (2003) <http://fundacionsignum.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/aaa_mediacion-arbitraje-resolucion-conflictos-dispute-wise_study_research_report_2011.pdf > accessed 19 April 2023, 9.

[46] Loukas (n 44).

[47] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rules 75-86.

[48] Yas Banifatemi, ‘Chapter 1: Expedited Proceedings in International Arbitration’ in Laurent Lévy and Michael Polkinghorne (eds), Expedited Procedures in International Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law (Volume 16  Kluwer Law International; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 2017) < https://www-kluwerarbitration-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/document/print?ids=kli-ka-201716003-n&title=PDF>, 9.

[49] ICSID, ‘Proposal for Amendment of the ICSID Rules – Working Paper # 1’ (2 August 2018) <https://icsid. worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/WP1_Amendments_Vol_3_WP-updated9.17.18.pdf> accessed 15 April 2023, 914, para 43.

[50] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 75.

[51] ibid, Rule 86.

[52] ibid, Rule 75(2)(a).

[53] ibid, Rules 80, 81, 84.

[54] ibid, Rule 82.

[55] Yas (n 49).

[56] ibid.

[57] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 30 and Appendix VI.

[58] UNCITRAL Expedited Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 1, 2.

[59] ibid, Article 4.

[60] ibid, Article 11.

[61] ibid, Article 12.

[62] ibid, Article 15.

[63] LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 9A.

[64] ibid, Article 14.5.

[65] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 46.

[66] ibid, Rule 46(1).

[67] ibid, Rule 46(2).

[68] ibid, Rule 46(3).

[69] ibid, Rule 46(4).

[70] Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4; Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6.

[71] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 10.                 

[72] LCIA Arbitration Rules (2020), Article 22A.

[73] Ibid.

[74] ICSID Convention (1965), Article 41(2).

[75] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2006), Rule 41(3).

[76] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 42.

[77] ibid, Rule 44.

[78] ibid, Rule 42 (3)(a),(b) and (c).

[79] Lucy Greenwood, ‘Revisiting Bifurcation and Efficiency in International Arbitration Proceedings’ (2019) 36 Journal of International Arbitration <https://kluwerlawonline-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/journalarticle/Journal+of+International+Arbitration/36.4/JOIA2019021> accessed 19 April 2023, 421–430.

[80] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Appendix IV.

[81] LCIA Arbitration Rules, Article 14.5.

[82] ibid, Article 14.6(iv).

[83] UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 17(1).

[84] ibid, Article 34(1).

[85] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Rule 53.

[86] ibid, Rule 53(3).

[87] ibid, Rule 53(6).

[88] Susan D Franck, ‘Rationalising Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2011) 88 Wash UL Rev < https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/197/> accessed 19 April 2023, 777.

[89] Christine Sim, ‘Security for Costs in Investor–State Arbitration, Arbitration International’ (2017) 33/ 3, OUP Arbitration International < https://doi-org.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl/10.1093/arbint/aix014> accessed 19 April 2023.

[90] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 37.

[91] LCIA Arbitration Rules (2020), Article 25.2.

[92] UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 45.

[93] ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), Article 53.

[94] UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 43.

[95] ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), Article 37.

[96] LCIA Arbitration Rules (2020), Article 25.2.

[97] ibid, Article 25.2.